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Reactionary Politics Is Bad Politics

Bet on principles, law, and logic in a world that keeps delivering disappointing results.

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Gökhan Mergen My Blog: Post AGI

By the Financial Times’ count, 2024 was the first year in nearly 120 years of records in which every governing party in the developed world that faced a national election lost vote share (Reason). Left, right, and center made no difference. Prices had gone up, the post-pandemic world felt disorderly, and voters punished whoever happened to be holding the keys.

Four or eight years later, the challengers who rode that anger into office will deliver their own disappointments, and the electorate will swing back again. We flatter ourselves by calling this democratic accountability. Mostly, it isn’t. Lurching from one flawed option to its mirror image is not a correction—it is a reflex.

There is an uncomfortable truth at the heart of mass democracy, one that polite politicians are forbidden from saying out loud: in the blunt vernacular, the masses are often asses.

We are conditioned to profess blind faith in the wisdom of the crowd and the idea that the electorate will eventually steer a nation toward justice and prosperity. History offers little reason for such romanticism. Large portions of any electorate are functionally illiterate about the complex machinery of macroeconomics, supply chains, and institutional governance. Worse, deep reservoirs of xenophobia, racism, and tribal intolerance remain permanent features of human society, waiting for a bad decade to call them up.

When the world delivers disappointing results—often because a country was set up to fail by the compounding errors of multiple previous administrations—voters rarely conduct a root-cause analysis. They look for a scapegoat and reach for the opposite of whatever is currently in front of them.

Call this reactionary politics: politics driven by anger at the last disappointment rather than by any coherent theory of what works. My argument is simple. Reactionary politics is bad politics, whichever direction the pendulum swings, and the human impulses that drive it are not going away. In a world guaranteed to keep delivering disappointing results, the only bet that pays over time is on rules: law that binds whoever wins, and logic that does not bend with the public mood.

The Voter Is Not an Economist

Let’s start with what the crowd doesn’t know, without being sentimental about it. Most voters know very little about public policy, and in a narrow sense, that is entirely rational. Because a single ballot almost never decides an election, the personal payoff from spending evenings studying tariff incidence, entitlement math, or monetary policy is close to zero. Economists call this rational ignorance.

The optimistic reply is that ignorance cancels out: if uninformed voters guess at random, their errors wash away at the ballot box and the informed minority decides. The trouble is that the errors are not random. In The Myth of the Rational Voter (2007), economist Bryan Caplan compared the public’s beliefs with those of trained economists and found systematic errors pointing in the exact same direction every time:

  • Anti-market bias: A belief that profits are suspect, prices are dictated by corporate greed rather than supply and demand, and price controls fix shortages.
  • Anti-foreign bias: A conviction that trade and immigration are zero-sum losses rather than mutually beneficial exchanges.
  • Make-work bias: A tendency to value the preservation of inefficient jobs over the actual production of goods and services.
  • Pessimistic bias: An unshakable conviction that economic conditions are perpetually deteriorating, regardless of what the data show.

Random ignorance cancels out. Systematic bias adds up—and politicians who flatter those biases get elected.

Voters are also hopelessly short-sighted about cause and effect. Countries are massive, slow-turning ships. When a nation suffers inflation, crumbling infrastructure, a fiscal crisis, or industrial hollowing-out, the pain is almost never the sole creation of whoever sat in the executive chair for the last twenty-four months. Decades of kicking the can down the road across multiple administrations finally come due.

Yet voters grade governments on the last few minutes of the game. Political scientists Andrew Healy and Gabriel Lenz (2014) showed that while voters intend to judge a leader’s full record, they unconsciously substitute election-year conditions for the whole term. In Democracy for Realists (2016), Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels argued that voters not only weigh the final months of an economy far more than the preceding years, but routinely punish incumbents for events no government controls, such as droughts and floods. Similarly, Andrew Healy and Neil Malhotra (2009) found that American voters handsomely reward politicians for handing out disaster relief after a catastrophe, but offer zero electoral reward for disaster preparedness—even though a dollar of preparedness saves roughly fifteen dollars of future damage.

None of this makes ordinary citizens villains. It is simply what happens when busy people with jobs, kids, and mortgages are asked to audit complex systems they have neither the time nor the training to study. But it means the crowd’s verdict on Election Day is a weather report, not an audit.

The Constituency That Never Left

Ignorance can be remedied, at least in principle. The deeper problem is that a large share of every electorate is not merely uninformed; it is waiting for permission to indulge its worst instincts.

We like to imagine history as a one-way ratchet toward enlightenment—a steady march in which racism was defeated, fascism was vanquished, the Old South disappeared, and humanity learned its lessons.

Except it didn’t. Prejudice and authoritarianism are sticky in ways that should unsettle anyone who believes moral progress is automatic.

Consider the American context. In Deep Roots (2018), Avidit Acharya, Matthew Blackwell, and Maya Sen demonstrated that white Southerners living today in counties where slavery was most concentrated in 1860 remain measurably more racially resentful and more opposed to affirmative action than comparable white citizens elsewhere. “The South” of Jim Crow is not merely a historical chapter or a geographic caricature. It is an institutional and cultural inheritance—a political instinct of racial hierarchy and grievance that was passed down across generations, adopted new vocabulary, and found new political homes.

European history tells an even starker story about the persistence of prejudice. Economists Nico Voigtländer and Hans-Joachim Voth studied German towns where Jewish communities were massacred during the Black Death in 1348–50. Nearly six centuries later, those exact same towns were significantly more likely to stage violent pogroms in the 1920s and to vote Nazi in 1928. In a subsequent study, they found that Germans who came of age under Nazi schooling still held the most virulent antisemitic views in national surveys conducted as late as 1996 and 2006.

That underlying disposition has a modern name. Political psychologist Karen Stenner has shown that roughly a third of the population across modern liberal democracies carries a latent predisposition toward authoritarianism: a deep-seated preference for sameness, conformity, and obedience over freedom, complexity, and difference. In calm, prosperous times, pacified by stable job markets and cheap consumer goods, this faction is nearly invisible. Under what Stenner calls normative threat—rapid social change, visible demographic shifts, economic anxiety, or public disorder—that latent impulse switches on. Demagogues do not have to invent xenophobia or intolerance; they merely tap into a standing reserve, roughly a third of the electorate deep, that is always sitting there waiting for an excuse to overflow.

The rise of the Nazis illustrates why getting the numbers right matters—because the real story is both more frightening and more instructive than the myth of an all-powerful mob. The Nazis never won a majority in a free election (History Today). Riding the shock of the Great Depression, their vote share in free elections peaked at 37.3% in July 1932. By November 1932, their surge was already receding: they lost two million votes, falling to 33.1%.

Hitler did not take power through a majority mandate. He became chancellor on January 30, 1933, because President Hindenburg appointed him at the urging of conservative insiders like Franz von Papen, who fatally assumed they could use his movement’s energy while boxing him in. Even in the March 1933 elections—held after the Reichstag fire, with Communist deputies arrested, civil liberties suspended, and brownshirts intimidating voters in the streets—the Nazis reached only 43.9%. Dictatorship was sealed when the Catholic Centre and other non-Nazi parties voted to pass the Enabling Act, with only the Social Democrats voting no.

The historical lesson is not that an entire population turned into monsters overnight. It is that a committed authoritarian minority of 30% to 40%, combined with widespread public disillusionment and cynical elites willing to bend constitutional rules for short-term leverage, is more than enough to bring down a republic.

Why Reaction Is Not a Governing Philosophy

Put a myopic electorate and a permanent authoritarian reserve inside a world that regularly produces bad news, and you get the pendulum of reactionary politics.

An administration takes office inheriting decades of structural rot—unsustainable debt, deferred maintenance, demographic headwinds, or fragile supply chains. Results disappoint. Rather than asking whether the problems require decades to untangle, voters conclude that the people in charge are terrible and reach for whoever promises the opposite.

Reactionary politics mistakes emotional clarity for intellectual clarity. Anger can identify a problem. It cannot, by itself, design a solution. As a governing philosophy, reaction fails for four distinct reasons:

  1. It reads the wrong signal and punishes the cleanup crew. Because policy outcomes are delayed and noisy, the administration that builds a fiscal or economic trap often leaves office before the bill arrives, remembered fondly for the boom times. The successor administration that takes over a country set up to fail takes the blame for the crash. Voters punish the cleanup crew for a fire started twenty years ago, and in their rage, hand the matches back to the arsonist.
  2. It substitutes opposites for solutions. Reactionary logic assumes that if current policy X produced frustration, the inverse of X must be wisdom. If globalization created painful local dislocations, the answer must be autarkic nationalism. If excessive regulation slowed growth, the answer must be reckless deregulation. If crime rises, swing from defunding the police to putting soldiers on the streets. If inflation spikes, impose price caps. But the opposite of a bad policy is frequently just a different kind of bad policy. And the opposite of a disappointing democracy is almost always something far worse than democracy.
  3. It selects for the confident liar. When the public mood is furious, the politician who tells voters the truth—that the problems are structural, the trade-offs are painful, and real solutions will take ten years—loses to the charlatan who promises that everything can be fixed by spring if we simply purge the right enemies. Over time, policy whiplash raises the cost of every long-term commitment, ensuring the next cycle of disappointment arrives even faster.
  4. It eats the rules. Every swing of the reactionary pendulum tempts the winners to bypass institutional guardrails to deliver quick victories. Emergency declarations, rule by executive decree (the Weimar disease under Article 48), and politicized prosecutions become normalized. Each tool forged for your champion is inherited by your worst enemy after the next election. A country that lurches between angry factions ends up with a state apparatus strong enough to crush whoever is out of power—and every faction eventually is.

The Bet on Law and Logic

If the public is easily duped by economic complexity, prone to wild pendulum swings, and permanently harbors a large faction predisposed to intolerance, how does a free society survive?

Not by abandoning democracy, and certainly not by dreaming of a benevolent strongman. We survive by abandoning romanticism about democracy—and betting everything on the strength of the rules we build around human nature.

Democracy is valuable not because majorities are inherently wise, but because it provides a peaceful mechanism for replacing bad governments, distributing power, and correcting mistakes without bloodshed. Because those majorities are frequently misinformed or gripped by passion, a functioning republic must be built to survive an unenlightened majority.

The architects of the American Constitution understood this far better than many who invoke them today. They did not trust the masses—and more to the point, they did not trust elites either. As James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 51:

“If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”

Madison defended the Senate in Federalist No. 63 as a necessary defense for the people “against their own temporary errors and delusions,” while Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 71 that republican government does not demand “an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion.” Staggered elections, separated powers, independent courts, and a constitution that is deliberately difficult to amend are precommitments: Ulysses tying himself to the mast while calm because he knows exactly how seductive the sirens will sound when the storm hits.

Making that wager today requires anchoring ourselves to two unyielding principles:

1. The Principle of Law: Rules That Bind Whoever Wins

The rule of law matters whether the law protects someone we admire or someone we despise. Due process matters whether the accused is politically sympathetic or repulsive. Free expression matters most when the speaker says something offensive. Institutional independence matters most when a court or agency reaches a conclusion we dislike.

If our commitment to constitutional principles evaporates whenever they produce an inconvenient result, then we never believed in the principles—we merely liked winning. The true test of a principle is whether you are willing to defend it when doing so costs your side something. If you would fear a state power in the hands of your worst political enemy, do not grant it to your champion. A rule that only holds when your faction is in charge is not a rule; it is a weapon on loan.

2. The Principle of Logic: Evidence That Does Not Bend With the Mood

Reality is not obligated to respect public opinion. A sensible economic policy does not become foolish because an angry electorate rejects it, and a ruinous policy does not become workable because it wins a landslide.

We already rely on this principle where we trust our short-term impulses least. Independent central banks exist precisely because elected officials reliably crave easy money before an election—as seen when Richard Nixon leaned on the Federal Reserve in 1971 and 1972, helping ignite a decade of stagflation. Nonpartisan statistical agencies exist so unemployment and inflation numbers are published whether or not they flatter the incumbent. Governing by logic means subjecting public policy to the same ruthless empirical standard as a clinical trial: compared with the realistic alternative, what does the evidence say actually works?

This is not a plea for unaccountable rule by credentialed experts. Experts can suffer from groupthink, laws can be unjust, and institutions can decay into self-serving guilds. When they do, the remedy is transparent scrutiny, empirical evidence, and constitutional reform—not burning down the referee’s booth because we disliked the last call. The rules must remain narrow, public, and enforceable against the very people who administer them.

Escaping the Contempt Trap

There is a dangerous temptation woven into everything above, and it is worth naming directly. Once you recognize the scale of voter ignorance and latent prejudice, it is deeply satisfying to retreat into cynical contempt—to conclude that the masses are irredeemable fools not worth persuading.

We must resist that trap, for three reasons:

  1. Contempt is its own reactionary reflex. It is the emotional tantrum of the educated class when voters deliver an election result they hate. Governing or speaking from that sneer is the exact same mistake as the reactionary voter’s, merely pointed in the opposite direction.
  2. Contempt is the strongman’s best recruiting tool. The authoritarian populist’s pitch is always identical: They despise you, they think you are stupid, and I am your retribution. Every display of smug condescension toward ordinary citizens works as an unpaid campaign commercial for the demagogue.
  3. Contempt leads to von Papen’s fatal error. When elites convince themselves that the public is simply a herd to be managed, they begin to believe they can suspend norms, manipulate populist anger, and keep the monster on a leash. That hubris has a historical body count.

Constitutional realism is not elitist contempt; it is universal humility. The foundational premise of liberal constitutionalism is not that ordinary voters are uniquely foolish while elites are wise. It is that nobody—not the crowd at a rally, not the credentialed technocrat, and not the people writing or reading essays like this one—reasons well when frightened, tribal, or angry, and therefore no one can be trusted with unchecked power.

Respecting fellow citizens also means taking their frustrations seriously without flattering their delusions. The factory worker whose town hollowed out, the parent watching a local school fail, and the young family priced out of housing are not imagining their problems. They are usually right that something is broken, even when they have been sold a destructive lie about who broke it and how to fix it. The job of serious politics is to offer them workable solutions grounded in reality, not to sneer at them for falling for a con artist.

Bet on What Endures

So here is the wager, stated plainly.

Assume the electorate will remain roughly as economically uninformed, short-sighted, and susceptible to scapegoating as it has always been. Assume that a third of any population can be activated by fear into supporting authoritarian intolerance. Assume that the world will keep delivering disappointing results, because governing complex societies is hard and the bills for past mistakes will keep arriving on schedule.

Then ask yourself what kind of political philosophy can survive those assumptions. Not one that requires a permanently enlightened majority—there has never been such a thing. And not one that only works when the “right people” win every election.

Instead, make the harder, more durable bet:

  • Bet on the rule of law when the law protects someone you despise or produces an outcome you dislike.
  • Bet on economic logic when the crowd demands magical, pain-free solutions.
  • Bet on empirical evidence when tribal slogans are far more popular.
  • Bet on institutional reform when tearing things down is more emotionally cathartic.
  • Bet on constitutional limits especially when your own preferred leaders hold power.

The world will continue to deliver disappointing results. The electorate will continue to make mistakes. The political pendulum will continue to swing.

Our job is not to swing with it. Our job is to build and defend rules strong enough that when the storm hits and the crowd is angry, the things worth preserving are still left standing when the mood passes.

Further Reading

  • Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government (Princeton University Press, 2016).
  • Acharya, Avidit, Matthew Blackwell, and Maya Sen. Deep Roots: How Slavery Still Shapes Southern Politics (Princeton University Press, 2018).
  • Caplan, Bryan. The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies (Princeton University Press, 2007).
  • Hamilton, Alexander, and James Madison. The Federalist Papers, specifically Nos. 51, 63, and 71 (1787–88).
  • Healy, Andrew, and Gabriel S. Lenz. “Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters Respond Primarily to the Election-Year Economy,” American Journal of Political Science (2014).
  • Healy, Andrew, and Neil Malhotra. “Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy,” American Political Science Review (2009).
  • Stenner, Karen. The Authoritarian Dynamic (Cambridge University Press, 2005); see also Alberta Views profile.
  • Voigtländer, Nico, and Hans-Joachim Voth. “Persecution Perpetuated: The Medieval Origins of Anti-Semitic Violence in Nazi Germany,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (2012).
  • Voigtländer, Nico, and Hans-Joachim Voth. “Nazi Indoctrination and Anti-Semitic Beliefs in Germany,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2015).

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